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the legatee claimed as compensation, the amount of the legacy in addition to the market value of the land on the ground that failure to use the named site would forfeit the legacy. *Held*, that the legacy would not be forfeited. *New Haven County v. Parish of Trinity Church*, 73 Atl. 789 (Conn.).

The effect of non-performance of a condition subsequent is ordinarily to divest the legacy. *Wheeler v. Lester*, 1 Bradf. (N. Y.) 213. However, there will be no forfeiture when performance by the legatee is, or later becomes impossible; as, for example, where he is prevented from performing by act of God. *Parker v. Parker*, 123 Mass. 584. The same is true when performance is impossible because illegal. *Cheairs v. Smith*, 37 Miss. 646. Impossibility because of foreign law is also an excuse. *Young v. Vass' Ex'r*, 1 Patt. & H. (Va.) 167. In all these cases, the law seeks to give effect to the testator's intentions; so if his primary object can still be accomplished, the legacy should not be divested, merely because it cannot be applied exactly as prescribed. *Young v. Vass' Ex'r, supra*. But if the illegal condition is the sole motive of the bequest, the legatee being merely a trustee not intended to take a beneficial interest, the gift will be forfeited. *Lusk v. Lewis*, 32 Miss. 297. Since the location of the Sunday school on the particular site was not the primary motive of the testatrix, the principal case seems rightly decided.

**LIFE ESTATE — PERSONALTY TO FOLLOW LIMITATIONS OF REALTY.** — Certain chattels were given to be "used, held and enjoyed" by the person for the time being entitled to a certain mansion-house; but title to them was not to vest in a tenant-in-tail until majority, although such tenant was to have the "use and benefit" of them until that time. A tenant-in-tail attained majority, but died before coming into possession of the realty. *Held*, that since there is a plain intention on the part of the settlor, that the chattels should vest in a tenant-in-tail in possession, the personal representative of the deceased is not entitled to them. *In re Lord Chesham's Settlement*, 25 T. L. R. 657 (Eng., Ct. App., June 15, 1909).

This decision reverses that of the Chancery Division discussed in 22 HARV. L. REV. 441.

**MORTGAGES — PRIORITIES — MORTGAGE FOR FUTURE ADVANCES.** — A executed a mortgage to B in the form of a bill of sale of a certain dredge, to secure the repayment of money already advanced and such advances as might thereafter be made. This mortgage was duly recorded. A later gave a second mortgage to C, which was likewise recorded. In ignorance of the mortgage to C, B made further advances to A. C knew the amount of the original advance by B, and probably knew the state of the accounts between A and B when he took his second mortgage. *Held*, that B's lien is prior to that of C both as to the original and as to the subsequent advances. *The Seattle*, 170 Fed. 284 (C. C. A., Ninth Circ.).

A mortgage to secure present and future advances gives a prior lien for advances made in ignorance of, but subsequent to, an intervening incumbrance. *Ackerman v. Hunsicker*, 85 N. Y. 43. The mortgagor is in the position of a trustee or other obligor who has dealt with his obligee in ignorance of an assignment or incumbrance of the latter's interest. Cf. *Newman v. Newman*, 28 Ch. D. 674. By the great weight of authority, the recording of the second mortgage is not a notice to the first mortgagor, unless he takes a new conveyance. This is true even where the statute makes the record notice "to all persons"; for this is taken to mean only those acquiring a new interest, whereas the mortgagor relies on what he already has. *Birnie v. Main*, 29 Ark. 591. *Contra, Ladue v. Detroit & Milwaukee R. R.*, 13 Mich. 380. The court questions *obiter* whether a mere statement that the mortgage is "for advances to be made" is not too vague. A second mortgagor, however, who advanced his money without inquiry as to their amount could hardly be a *bona fide* purchaser; and he could protect himself as to subsequent advances by giving notice of his incumbrance to the first mortgagee. *Witczinski v. Everman*, 51 Miss. 841. *Contra, Balch v. Chaffee*, 73 Conn. 318.